What is in a per-call evidence file

A demand letter asks one question: what happened on this call, on this date, to this number. Every field described below exists to answer it without anybody’s memory being involved, and without access to the live system.

One attempt, one file

Every attempt the platform places or refuses produces exactly one policy snapshot. A call with no attempt behind it carries its snapshot on the call instead. One home per call, never both and never neither — which reads like an implementation detail right up until you are the person trying to prove a negative years later.

What the file records

• The identifiers, and the runtime and pipeline versions pinned, so the call is reproducible.
• The disclosure: its exact compiled text, and playback confirmed by media-stream offset rather than by an intention to play it.
• Normalization: the number as validated to E.164, rejected as a short code, or deduped against the run.
• Internal suppression: your own do-not-call list applied when the list was prepared, and read live again at dial time, never from cache.
• Consent: the record relied on, with its class, its scope, its source and a content hash over the proof — or the exemption class instead.
• The values that bound the dial: the calling window evaluated in the contact’s local time, the attempt cap, the consent standard, and the recording-consent class.
• Where each of those values came from, because a value we applied must never read as a value we vouched for.
• The elections: every supplier-backed stage you run upstream, rendered as waived with its attestation reference and the person who signed it.
• The outcome: the disposition, the opt-out and transfer events, and the suppression write recorded as written, failed, or not applicable.

Waived is a signature, not a silence

This is the rule the whole artifact turns on, and it is the one we would refuse to compromise if a customer asked us to.

You run whatever screening arrangement you have chosen, upstream, on your own list, and you sign one attestation naming it, its signer and its date.

Every stage that attestation covers appears in the file as an election rather than as a result. The stage name, the word waived, the attestation reference, and the signer’s name and role sit together on the row. A reader who was not there can see exactly who decided the stage would not run here, and on which document they decided it.

A check that did not run must never read as a check that found nothing. Those are opposite facts, and a file that renders them identically has destroyed the only information the reviewer came for.

A missing check with no election is a bug

The mirror of that rule matters more than it sounds. An account carrying no attestation for the stages it runs upstream screens its contacts undialable, with the missing document named, so the dial waits for a signature.

That is the difference between a system that fails closed and one that fails quiet. A gap in the record is not a pass and is never rendered as one.

Three states a reader has to tell apart

Checked, and clear. Checked, and suppressed, with the reason on the row. Not performed here, under a named election with a signature attached.

A record that cannot tell those three apart is not evidence. It is a log.

What the file is worth on the day you need it

You and your counsel set the standard your calling has to meet. From there the platform does the work: it applies the values you set, blocks the calls that must not happen, and writes down what bound every one of the rest.

That is what turns a demand letter from a fire drill into a lookup. The answer was written on the day of the call, by the system that placed it, instead of being reconstructed months later by whoever still remembers the campaign.

How it gets out

The snapshot rides as a column on the attempt row and leaves through the exports API as CSV, like every other resource on the platform. The audit tables behind it are append-only: no database role holds UPDATE or DELETE on them, so a correction is a new row referencing the one it corrects rather than an edit to history.

Retention is set by the platform rather than by the tenant, and compliance evidence is excluded from tenant-initiated deletion, because the file is the platform’s own defense record as much as yours.

A synthetic sample, rendered key for key, is published on the evidence page. The engine that writes it — the controls with no off state, the single dialability gate, and the consent taxonomy behind the record — is on the compliance page, and the responsibility split is stated in your Telecom Compliance Addendum.